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Fundamentalist Christian Educators v. 
State: An Inevitable Compromise 
Neal Devins* 
The war between state regulators and religious parents and edu-
cators persists. The main battlefield is state regulations governing 
the education of children at home and in private schools. 
On one side, religious parents and educators claim that state-pre-
scribed "minimum standards" and licensing procedures improperly 
interfere with their religious beliefs. This claim is rooted in the 
right to religious expression guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment1 and the implied Fourteenth Amendment 
right of parents to direct their children's upbringing.2 Over the past 
twenty years, this challenge to state authority has been championed 
principally by Fundamentalist Christian educators3 and parents.4 
* Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and 
Mary. The Author would like to thank Peter Dutton for exceptional research assistance. 
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); see U.S. CoNST. amend 
XIV. 
3. "Fundamentalist Christian educators" refers to evangelical Protestants and their 
churches. These churches typically are not affiliated with mainstream Protestant denom-
inations. See James C. Carper, The Christian Day School, in RELIGIOUS ScHOOLING IN 
AMERICA 115-18 (James C. Carper & Thomas C. Hunt eds., 1984). 
4. See generally James C. Carper & Neal E. Devins, The State and the Christian Day 
School, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: EssAYS IN HoNOR OF LEO PFEFFER 211 (James E. 
Wood, Jr. ed., 1985) (exploring the controversy between a state's right to impose rea-
sonable regulations on religious schools and the Fundamentalist Christian day schools' 
constitutional right to be free from unwanted state regulation); Neal Devins, A Constitu-
tional Right to Home Instruction?, 62 WASH. U. L.Q 435 (1984) (defining the states' bound-
aries regarding regulation of home education and arguing that although the state may 
regulate home education, it cannot prohibit it altogether); Patricia M. Lines, Private Edu-
cation Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J.L. & Enuc. 189 (1983) (discussing the home 
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On the other side, state authorities emphasize their right to im-
pose "reasonable" regulations on religious schools and religious 
home instruction. State officials assert that these regulations estab-
lish minimum criteria to protect children from the adverse conse-
quences of an inadequate education. The state, moreover, claims an 
independent interest in assisting the child in developing citizenship 
skills. Schools and parents who do not conform to these regulations 
violate compulsory school attendance laws and may be subject to 
criminal prosecution. 
From 1975 to 1983, Fundamentalist Christian educators and par-
ents fought a holy war against state officials. Neither side seemed 
especially interested in accommodating the other and, as a result, 
lawsuits emerged in most states. Sometimes religious liberty claim-
ants would succeed; most times the state would prevail. But these 
state victories came at a substantial price. Unwilling to comply with 
court-approved regulations, religious parents and ministers were 
jailed, churches were padlocked, and states threatened to terminate 
parental rights. 5 
Since 1983, this struggle, though far from dormant, has become 
subdued. Each side seems more accepting of the other. More sig-
nificantly, the battle has shifted away from adversarial winner-take-
all litigation towards legislative reform. Since 1982, thirty-four 
states have adopted home school statutes or regulations.6 Twenty-
three of these states, moreover, have repealed teacher certification 
requirements; only one state-Michigan-still demands that all 
pupils be taught by a certified teacher.7 
education movement and examining the constitutional implications of state regulation); 
Ira C. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers, 67 B.U. L. REv. 
971 (1987) (examining the constitutional implications of state regulation ofhome edu-
cation and arguing that for constitutional and other reasons, home education should be 
discouraged); Cynthia W. West, Comment, The State and Sectarian Education: Regulation to 
Deregulation, 1980 DuKE LJ. 801 (examining the constitutional boundaries within which a 
state may regulate religious schools and discussing the constitutional and policy implica-
tions oflegislative deregulation of religious schools). 
5. See Neal Devins, Nebraska and the Future of State Regulation of Christian Schools, in 
GoVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, II, at 107 (Dean M. Kelly ed., 1986); 
David Moshman, Faith Christian v. Nebraska: Parent, Child, and Community Rights in the 
Education Arena, 86 TCHRS. C. REc. 553 (1985) (discussing the situation surrounding the 
Faith Christian School). 
6. Christopher J. Klicka, Home Schooling in the United States: A Statutory Analy-
sis (Aug. 1990) (on file with Author); see also Donald P. Dorman, Note, Michigan :s- Teacher 
Certification Requirement as Applied to Religiously Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 733, 746-54 (1990) (arguing that a Michigan statute requiring teacher certification 
for parental home instructors is unconstitutional); HoME ScH. CT. REP., May:June 1991, 
at 8. 
7. In 1983, 24 states demanded that home schools be taught by a certified teacher. 
See Lines, supra note 4, at 227-34. Today, Michigan is the only state that has a teacher 
certification requirement. See HoME ScH. CT. REP., july-Aug. 1991, at I; infra notes 96-
100 and accompanying text. 
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This Essay will examine the transformation of controversies be-
tween Fundamentalist Christian educators and state education offi-
cials from court confrontations to political compromise. In 
examining this shifting landscape, three points will be made. First, 
litigation is ill-suited to resolve this conflict. The differences be-
tween Fundamentalist Christian educators and state officials become 
more pronounced during litigation, even though both sides share 
significant common ground. 8 Court rulings rarely recognize this 
common ground; instead, courts seem predisposed either to ap-
prove or to invalidate all regulations. Making matters worse, judg-
ments are difficult to enforce because the termination of parental 
rights and other sanctions for noncompliance are too severe to put 
into effect. Second, the Supreme Court's free-exercise decisions 
play a rather small role in this field. The state political process, on 
the other hand, is as a matter of political necessity extraordinarily 
sensitive to religious liberty concerns. The jailing of dedicated par-
ents and religious officials does not sit well with the electorate, espe-
cially when children in Fundamentalist Christian schools and home 
study programs outperform their public school counterparts. 
Third, political compromise should not be equated with political ab-
dication. Important state objectives are best served through coop-
erative measures. State officials, therefore, should not shy away 
from insisting that in critical areas these Fundamentalist Christian 
school and home study students measure up to public school 
standards. 
I. The Failure of the Adversarial Model 
The legal battle between state regulators and religious parents 
and educators apparently pits intractable foes in a fight to the death. 
Religious interests, it seems, reject any state involvement in their ed-
ucational ministries.9 State actors seem likewise unyielding in their 
demand that religious educators mimic their public school counter-
parts.10 When one examines the legal arguments and rhetorical 
posturing that surrounds their court battles, however, this caricatur-
ing becomes understandable. 
A. The Interests of the Adversaries 
The source of the confrontation is widespread dissatisfaction 
among Fundamentalist Christian parents and educators with the 
state educational establishment. The main reason these Fundamen-
talist Christian parents opt out of public schools is their perception 
8. Cf Lupu, supra note 4, at 987 (noting that Christian parents are unwilling to 
"submit to a jurisdiction whose very exercise they find constitutionally-and relig-
iously--objectionable''). 
9. See id.; Tom Minnery, Does David Gibbs Practice Law as Well as He Preaches Church-
State Separation?, CHRISTIANITY ToDAY, Apr. 10, 1981, at 48. 
10. See STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF 100-01, 121-22 (1983) (cataloging criti-
cisms of the values public schooling furthers and ideological justifications given in de-
fense of public education). 
820 [VOL. 60:818 
Devins 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
that the "secularization" of public schools, (attributed to Supreme 
Court decisions prohibiting organized prayer, 11 Bible reading, 12 the 
teaching of Biblical creation, 13 and the posting of the Ten Com~ 
mandments14 in public schools) denies their right to oversee the up~ 
bringing of their children as they see fit. Many Fundamentalist 
Christian educators also complain of the perceived "breakdown" in 
public education, associated with lack of discipline, sexual permis~ 
siveness, and drug and alcohol abuse. 15 In court, Fundamentalist 
Christians attack state regulations as being anti~religious and having 
a poor educational policy. They depict the state education bureau~ 
cracy as either insensitive or hostile to the religious mission of these 
Fundamentalist Christian educators. Unlike Catholic, Jewish, and 
other religious educators who often embrace teacher certification 
requirements and other state regulations, Fundamentalist Christian 
educators and home study proponents have greater difficulty com~ 
plying with state regulations that seek to make private schools like 
public schools.16 Contending that many of these regulations serve 
no useful educational purpose, Fundamentalist Christians deem 
state regulatory initiatives as de facto religious harassment. To sup~ 
port their regulatory ineffectiveness contention, Fundamentalist 
Christian educators and parents point to the fact that their students 
generally perform as well or better than their public school counter~ 
parts on nationally recognized achievement tests. 17 
Weighing against these arguments is the state's paramount inter~ 
est in the education of its youth. Education is one of the state's 
most compelling responsibilities. The state's interest in education 
was noted by the great education reformer Horace Mann, who said, 
"The true business of the schoolroom connects itself, and becomes 
11. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,436 (1962). 
12. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). 
13. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968). 
14. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980). 
15. See Carper, supra note 3, at 115-18. These reasons typically are cited by non-
Christian parents in explaining current dissatisfaction with public schools. See Thomas 
Toch, The Exodus, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 1991, at 66-67. The number of 
students who opt out for religious reasons is inexact. Most estimates suggest that 
1,000,000 students attend Christian schools and 300,000 children are taught at home-
about 75% of whom are taught by Christian parents. See Carper, supra note 3; Toch, 
supra, at 73. 
16. See generally Carper, supra note 3; Devins, supra note 4; Lines, supra note 4. 
17. See David Guterson, When Schools Fail Children, HARPER's, Nov. 1990, at 58, 59 
(contending that home-schooled children tend to score well above average on standard-
ized achievement tests); Alfie Kohn, Home Schooling, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1988, at 20, 21, 23 
(citing numerous studies concluding that the great m<Jjority of home-schooled students 
score above average on achievement tests); Brian D. Ray, The Kitchen Classroom, CHRISTI-
ANITY ToDAY, Aug. 12, 1988, at 23-24 (reviewing the growing empirical data supporting 
the theory that students taught at home score better on standardized tests than those 
who attend public schools). 
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identical, with the great interests of society." 18 In a similar vein, the 
Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Board of Education: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and 
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recog-
nition of the importance of education to our democratic soci-
ety .... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. 19 
Because of the centrality of the state's interest in ensuring the provi-
sion of good education to all youngsters, the state is vested with the 
authority to establish reasonable regulations governing both public 
and private schools. Not surprisingly, state education officials are 
reluctant to subordinate their rulemaking authority and instincts20 
to validate the deregulatory agenda of Fundamentalist Christian ed-
ucators and parents. 
B. The Failure of Judicial Balancing of Interests 
Judicial attempts to resolve this dispute have been truly unsatis-
factory. These cases often present courts with an apparently hope-
less entanglement of fact, judgment, secular values, and religious 
conviction. Consequently, court decisions on this issue are often at 
odds with one another. Some courts approve while others invali-
date identical regulatory schemes-all applying the "same" legal 
standard.21 There are also great variances within a state. State and 
local education officials are inconsistent in their application of often 
vague regulatory demands22 and are selective in their enforcement 
of the law. 23 
The variability of judicial decisionmaking is apparent in compet-
ing judicial perceptions of teacher certification requirements. 
Courts that rule for the state see themselves as "ill-equipped to act 
as school boards and determine the need for discrete aspects of a 
compulsory school education program,"24 and argue "that it goes 
without saying that the State has a compelling interest in the quality 
18. 2 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA: GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN LIFE 365 (1968) (quot-
ing HORACE MANN, TWELTH ANNUAL REP. OF THE MASS. BD. OF EDUC. (1848)). 
19. 347 u.s. 483, 493 (1954). 
20. See Eugene Bardach, Educational Paperwork, in ScHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 124 
(David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986); Robert A. Kagan, Regulating Business, 
Regulating Schools: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, in ScHOOL DAYS, supra, at 64. 
21. See generally Devins, supra note 4 (discussing the judicial rationales for validating 
various states' regulatory procedures in the face of constitutional challenges); Lines, 
supra note 4;James W. Tabak & Perry A. Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of the Statutes 
and Case Law, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1 (1982) (surveying the means by which states main-
tain control over home schooling). 
22. See Leah B. Ward, What Happens When Parents Tum Teachers, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 
1982, § 13, at 3 (comparing the disparate manners in which two Rhode Island families 
were treated under that state's home instruction laws). 
23. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text (discussing home school enforce-
ment in Michigan). 
24. State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 899-900 (N.D. 1980). 
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and ability of those who [teach] its young people."25 Courts that 
side with religious interests appear equally presumptive. They find 
it "difficult to imagine ... a state interest sufficiently substantial to 
sanction abrogation of [the parent's] liberty to direct the education 
of their children,"26 and, though seeing a bachelor's degree as an 
"indicator" of competency, nonetheless find a bachelor's require-
ment excessive because "it is not a sine qua non the absence of 
which establishes [incompetency]."27 
Vagaries injudicial approaches are a result of many factors. Poor 
lawyering on the parts of some state prosecutors and attorneys for 
Fundamentalist Christian educators offers a partial explanation for 
this judicial failure.28 Varying regulatory schemes are also at issue. 
More significantly, Supreme Court decisions provide ample support 
for each side. Parents and schools refer to language in Court rul-
ings that the state cannot "standardize" children by "forcing them 
to accept instruction from public teachers only,"29 that "[t]he child 
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to rec-
ognize and prepare him for additional obligations,"30 and that these 
"additional obligations" include "the inculcation of moral stan-
dards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."31 Attor-
neys for the state, in contrast, refer to Court opinions proclaiming 
that parents "have no constitutional right to provide their children 
with private school education unfettered by reasonable government 
regulation,"32 and recognizing state power "to require that all chil-
dren of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of 
good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies 
plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that noth-
ing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare."33 
Employment Division v. Smith 34 is not likely to clarify this muddle. 
25. State v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579 (Neb. 1981) (emphasis 
added). 
26. State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 (Ohio 1976) (emphasis added). 
27. Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 
u.s. 938 (1980). 
28. See James C. Carper, The Whisner Decision: A Case Study in State Regulation of Chris-
tian Day Schools, 24 J. CHURCH & ST. 281 (1983) (implying that the prosecution did not 
produce sufficient testimony to support its arguments); Minnery, supra note 9 (asserting 
that a fundamentalist Ohio law firm has lost important cases because of a lack of time 
and thoroughness by the firm's senior partner). On the importance of good lawyering, 
see William Bentley Ball, 60 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 809 (1992). 
29. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
30. /d. 
31. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
32. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976). 
33. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. 
34. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
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In holding that "the right to free exercise does not relieve an indi-
vidual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),' " 35 
Smith apparently limits free exercise protections to instances where 
religious practice is singled out for differential treatment. Because 
state regulations governing religious schools and parents extend to 
nonsectarian schools and parents, Smith's holding presumably ex-
tends to government regulation of church-based education minis-
tries. At the same time, Smith recognizes that when free exercise 
claims operate "in conjunction with other constitutional protec-
tions, such as ... the right of parents ... to direct the education of 
their children, " 36 heightened judicial scrutiny may well be appropri-
ate. Indeed, pointing to this language, attorneys for religious par-
ents and educators contend that Smith ultimately buttresses religious 
liberty claims against state education officials. Although this argu-
ment has yet to succeed, 37 Smith preserves an uneasy status quo of 
self-contradictory decisionmaking. 
Inconsistent rulings have proved especially destabilizing here. 
Each side had reason to think that they might secure a complete 
victory in courts, and thereby became more resolute in their posi-
tion. Indeed, the absolutist positions stated in adversariallitigation 
took hold and both sides became more extreme in their positions. 
Fundamentalist Christian educators and parents increasingly came 
to view their schools as God's property. At the urging of the Chris-
tian Law Association and other advocacy groups, 38 they repudiated 
state regulatory authority as inconsistent with the New Testament 
command to "render therefore to Caesar the things that are Cae-
sar's, and to God the things that are God's."39 The state also hard-
ened its position. Rather than limit its regulatory authority, some 
state officials preferred to close churches, and jail ministers and 
parents.40 
The adversarial model has also failed because of the high costs of 
enforcement. When the state loses in court, its regulatory scheme 
is, of course, without effect. When the state wins in court, however, 
it faces a dilemma. Religious educators and parents often profess 
that they would rather go to jail than comply with regulatory de-
mands that violate their religious beliefs. These are not empty 
threats. In Nebraska and Michigan for example, religious parents 
have been jailed for refusing to comply with teacher certification re-
quirements.41 Tremendous pressure is placed on the state through 
35. /d. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982)). 
36. /d. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
37. People v. Dejonge, 470 N.W.2d 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Crites v. Smith, App. 
No. 01-A-01-9101-CH-00002, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 
1991). 
38. See Minnery, supra note 9, at 49. 
39. Luke 20:25-26; Mark 12:17-18"; Matthew 22:21-22. 
40. See Devins, supra note 5, at 107. 
41. See id. at 112-15; Michigan: Home Schoolers Feel Pressure, HoME ScH. CT. REP. Mar.-
Apr. 1991, at 7-8). 
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this steadfast resistance. Sanctions such as the padlocking of 
churches, the jailing of ministers and parents, and the termination 
of parental rights can be successful only if there is widespread public 
support. But this support rarely emerges; for whatever wrong Fun-
damentalist Christian educators might be guilty of, it is a wrong that 
does not justify such severe sanctions. 
Disputes between the state and Fundamentalist Christian educa-
tors are ill-suited to judicial resolution. Indeed, resorts to legalism 
have clearly had a deleterious effect. By discouraging an out-of-
court constitutional dialogue between opposing sides, the issue was 
thrust into an adversarial setting with each side shouting slogans at 
the other. Worse yet, the conflict was prolonged by inconsistentju-
dicial approaches and generally successful disobedience to pro-state 
decisions. Along the way, children were harmed. Their lives lacked 
stability as their parents and the state engaged in open conflict over 
their hearts and souls. Rather than cooperate to ensure that all chil-
dren receive a quality education without unduly disrupting parental 
rights, litigation chilled efforts to find a common ground.42 
II. Politics as Religious Salvation 
Fundamentalist Christian educators and parents often lose in 
court. In almost all cases, however, religious interests ultimately 
prevail. How can this be? The answer is that the success of these 
Fundamentalist Christian educators is not contingent on favorable 
court rulings. Although regulations may ask too much of private 
schools and therefore be found unreasonable by courts,43 the state 
most often suffers political defeats.44 In the end, rather thanjailing 
parents and ministers for noncompliance, state officials ultimately 
back down from High Noon-style showdowns with Fundamentalist 
Christian educators and parents. This is the lesson of North Caro-
lina, Nebraska, Michigan, and several other states. 
42. Litigation, on occasion, prompts political solutions. Consequently, although lit-
igation, standing alone, is insufficient in fashioning appropriate policies, it may help 
frame subsequent political debates. At the same time, were the state and Christian edu-
cators willing to engage in a nonadversarial dialogue, solutions to policy disputes would 
be reached with less emotional, financial, and educational costs. In cases where 
nonadversarial dispute resolution proves impossible, litigation cannot be abandoned 
and may well serve a useful political purpose. For the reasons specified in this Section, 
however, litigation should be disfavored by both the state and religious educators. 
43. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979); State v. 
Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976). For an analysis of these decisions, see ARONS, 
supra note 10, at 157-85; Carper, supra note 28. 
44. See Perry A. Zirkel, Home Schooling, 1991 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 408, 409 ("The ten-
dency in recent years has been for the advocates of home schooling to win in the state 
legislatures, while they have lost in the !=Ourts."). 
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A. North Carolina 
The state political process in North Carolina has been extraordi-
narily sensitive to the religious liberty concerns of its citizens. On 
two separate occasions, the state legislature enacted deregulation 
measures in response to court rulings governing private religious 
education. When a 1978 state trial court decision approved existing 
curriculum and teacher certification requirements as "based upon 
sound educational policy and logic,"45 the legislature, in 1979, re-
acted by specifically exempting church-affiliated schools from most 
state oversight.46 The only obligations placed on religious schools 
were to keep attendance and disease immunization records,47 to 
comply with building codes,48 and to administer a nationally stan-
dardized achievement test, to be selected by the school and with no 
state-prescribed minimum score.49 These minimal demands were 
rooted in the belief that "in matters of education ... [n]o human 
authority shall interfere with the rights of conscience or with reli-
gious liberty."50 Indeed, the North Carolina legislature went so far 
as to create a Division of Nonpublic Education to accommodate fur-
ther religious liberty concerns.5 1 
This legislative turn-around was a response to "[intense] pressure 
from Fundamentalist Christian schools and fundamentalists."52 
Thousands of fundamentalists voiced support of reforms at hearings 
at the state capitol and within a year the deregulation measure was 
approved overwhelmingly.53 This outcome is hardly surprising. 
North Carolina is a "Bible belt" state with a large and vocal funda-
mentalist constituency, and the legislature's responsiveness to fun-
damentalist issues is due to this relative uniformity of a large 
segment of the voting population. 54 
The 1979 law, however, proved far from perfect for religious lib-
erty concerns. Home instruction was not mentioned in the law and 
the state's attorney general interpreted this omission to mean that 
home schools were unauthorized.55 The legislature "corrected" 
45. State v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 CVS 1678, slip op. at 14 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1978), vacated as moot (May 4, 1979). 
46. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 505. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -554 
(1991)). 
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-548 (1991). 
48. /d. 
49. Id. §§ 115C-549 to -550. 
50. Id. § 115C-547. 
51. Telephone Interview with Tim Simmons, Education Reporter, RALEIGH NEWS 
AND OBSERVER (Oct. 10, 1991) [hereinafter Simmons Interview]. 
52. David Perkins, Board Seeks Tighter Rein on Home Schools, RALEIGH NEws AND OB-
SERVER, Apr. 3, 1987, at 10, 20. 
53. Bill Would Require Diploma for Parents Teaching at Home, RALEIGH NEws AND OB-
SERVER, june 17, 1988; Telephone Interview with Charles Nettles, Legislative Vice-Presi-
dent of North Carolinians for Home Education (Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Nettles 
Interview]. 
54. Simmons Interview, supra note 51. 
55. 49 N.C. Att'y Gen. 8-9 (1979). 
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this interpretation in 1987,56 in large part as a response to a deci-
sion of the North Carolina Supreme Court.57 Only two minimal de-
mands are placed on the content of home study programs by the 
bill: home instructors must have a high school diploma or 
equivalent, and home school students must take an annual achieve-
ment test. 58 The law does not require a showing of any particular 
level of proficiency on the standardized achievement test; it requires 
no showing of competency on the part of the teacher to teach; it 
requires no health or safety inspections; and there are no curricu-
lum or minimum attendance requirements, except to operate on a 
"regular schedule" during at least nine calendar months. 59 
Religious liberty interests, in pushing through this bill, demol-
ished and demoralized the state education bureaucracy. The North 
Carolina State Board of Education sought to require home study 
parents to have graduated from college, to adhere to a five and one 
half hour school day, to comply with expansive curriculum de-
mands, and to demonstrate compliance with these guidelines to lo-
cal boards of education. 60 Home schoolers countered these efforts 
with their own reform package and a successful political strategy. 
Key legislators, willing to promote the home schoolers' model bill, 
were also identified. One such legislator was delegate Coy Privette, 
who argued from two premises: first, that "the basic responsibility 
for the education of children belongs to the parents,"61 and, sec-
ond, that because the public schools in North Carolina "consistently 
rank 48th or 49th in the nation on standardized tests, the public 
school process has not in fact been serving the state interests."62 
Therefore, he concluded, home educators could simply do a better 
job than the education establishment of protecting public values.63 
Home schoolers backed up these arguments with a strong show-
ing of support at legislative committee meetings. "Our tactic was to 
show up at every committee meeting with three or four hundred 
home educators .... We couldn't speak but they saw our interest 
and support," said Charles Nettles of North Carolinians for Home 
56. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 891 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-563 (1991)); see 
Perkins, supra note 52, at 10, 20; see also Devins, supra note 4, at 441; Edward K. Proctor 
V, Comment, Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1302, 
1314 (1986). 
57. Delconte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1985) (holding that parent's home 
school instruction of children met statutory requirement for complying with compulsory 
school attendance). 
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (1987). 
59. Id. §§ 115C-564, -565. 
60. See Perkins, supra note 52, at 10, 20. 
61. Telephone Interview with Coy Privette, Delegate, North Carolina General As-
sembly (Oct. 17, 1991). 
62. ld. 
63. ld. 
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Education. 64 "It all turned out so well, because we got so many 
people to lobby in Raleigh. We wanted the legislators to see what 
kind of people we really are. We try to do things the right way."65 
What made the greatest difference in getting legislation passed 
was that home educators turned their position into a religious issue. 
"During the legislative process, home schoolers originally took a 
straightforward political approach," noted Tim Simmons of the Ra-
leigh News and Observer. 66 "But this didn't take them anywhere. How-
ever, when the home schoolers added the religious angle, the 
legislature backed off quickly."67 According to Simmons, "[i]t was 
this emphasis on religion that became the pivotal issue, and the leg-
islature simply wanted to avoid crossing swords with the Fundamen-
talists, so religion became the trump card that won the game for 
home schoolers."6S 
Religious liberty interests did more than prevail. Their bill was 
approved ninety-three to zero in the state house;69 the state board 
proposal, in contrast, never made it out of the House Education 
Committee. 70 The political power of Fundamentalist Christians 
combined with the low national ranking of North Carolina public 
education explains this lopsided victory. 
B. Nebraska71 
The forces of reform manifested themselves quite differently in 
Nebraska. The most controversial battle between the state and Fun-
damentalist Christian educators centers around ajanuary 1981 Ne-
braska Supreme Court decision, State v. Faith Baptist Church, 72 
involving Pastor Everett Sileven's unaccredited Faith Christian 
School. Mter a three-year struggle with the state, Pastor Sileven-
who publicly prayed for God to kill state education officials73-
proved the eventual victor. That the state ultimately backed down 
suggests that the price of enforcing state regulatory schemes may be 
too great to be practicable. 
Events leading up to this widely publicized decision and its after-
math date back to 1977, when Faith Baptist Church of Louisville 
opened a school without state approval. The leadership of the 
church maintained that "the operation of the school is simply an 
extension of the ministry of the church, over which the State of Ne-
braska has no authority to approve or accredit." Asserting that the 
64. Nettles Interview, supra note 53. 
65. /d. 
66. Simmons Interview, supra note 51. 
67. /d. 
68. Telephone Interview with Tim Simmons, Education Reporter, RALEIGH NEws 
AND OBSERVER (Oct. 17, 1991). 
69. /d. 
70. /d. 
71. The following description of events in Nebraska is adapted from Devins, supra 
note 5, at 112-15. 
72. 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb.), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981). 
73. World of Religion, WASH. PosT, Feb. 12, 1983, at B6; see DAVID MoSHMAN, CHIL-
DREN, EDUCATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 168 (1989). 
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state had no "right to inspect God's property," Pastor Sileven and 
the church officers refused to (1) provide a list of the students en-
rolled in the school, (2) seek approval for the educational program, 
(3) employ certified teachers, and (4) seek approval to operate the 
institution. 
The state sought to enjoin the operation of the school because of 
noncompliance with state regulations. A lower state court ruled in 
favor of the state. The defendants then appealed to the Nebraska 
Supreme Court, which focused its attention on the state's compel-
ling interest in education. The court asserted that the state's re-
quirements for teacher certification and curriculum approval were 
minimal, testing could not protect the state's interest in education, 
and the state had the power to impose " 'reasonable regulations for 
the control and duration of basic education.' " 74 In rather terse lan-
guage it concluded that: 
The refusal of the defendants to comply with the compulsory edu-
cation laws of the State of Nebraska as applied in this case is an 
arbitrary and unreasonable attempt to thwart the legitimate, rea-
sonable, and compelling interests of the State in carrying out its 
educational obligations, under a claim of religious freedom. 75 
The Faith Baptist decision, in Sileven's eyes, only meant that his 
school could no longer lawfully operate in Nebraska. Instead, 
Sileven operated the school both in an Iowa church and "under-
ground" until he reopened the school at Faith Baptist Church. 76 
Refusing to close the institution because of his religious convictions, 
he was sentenced in February 1982 to four months in jail for con-
tempt of court.77 Sileven was released thirteen days later after 
promising Judge Raymond Case that he would keep the school 
closed. Two weeks later, however, the school was reopened.78 The 
game of arrest and release was repeated four times until Sileven 
eventually completed his four month term injanuary 1983.79 In the 
meantime, Sileven requested that the Nebraska legislature develop a 
regulatory scheme acceptable to all parties concerned. A special 
session ended November 13, without addressing the issue.80 
When Faith Christian School reopened in the fall of 1982 without 
74. Faith Baptist, 301 N.W.2d at 577 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 
(1972)). 
75. /d. at 580. 
76. Fred Barbash, 'Monday Schools' Invoke Bible and Constitution Against State, WASH. 
PosT, Nov. 27, 1981, at A6, A7. 
77. Sileven v. Tesch, 326 N.W.2d 850, 851-52 (Neb. 1982) (affirming lower court's 
order denying Sileven's request for release from incarceration). 
78. Town and Pastor are Angered Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1982, § 1, Part I, at 38. 
79. Minister Freed Again in School Cases, WASH. PosT, Feb. 1, 1983, at A4. 
80. Nebraska Minister jailed for Defying School Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1982, at A17; see 
Nebraska Revises Hiring Rules for Church Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1984, § 1, Part I, at 
21. 
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state approval, Sileven was arrested and returned to jail to complete 
the contempt-of-court sentence. To prevent continued operation of 
the school, the state, in October 1982, padlocked the church on 
weekdays.81 This action precipitated a protest involving upwards of 
five hundred people.82 The school, however, continued to operate 
under the supervision of Reverend Jim Lee. 83 
Amid threats of prosecution, Faith Christian School and as many 
as twenty-five other "nonapproved" institutions throughout Ne-
braska operated in 1983.84 Efforts at compromise during the fall of 
1983 again failed, and in November, six fathers of Faith Christian 
students werejailed-and remainedjailed until February 1984-for 
refusing to answer a judge's questions concerning the school.85 
Their wives and children then fled the state to avoid prosecution. 
The succeeding events in the saga of Faith Christian School 
demonstrate the difficulty a state may have in enforcing its regula-
tory scheme against resistant Fundamentalist Christian educators. 
This difficulty received national attention, and ultimately was the 
subject of federal scrutiny. In early December 1983, the United 
States Department ofjustice (DOJ) considered intervention.86 In a 
similar vein, United States Secretary of Education T.H. Bell sug-
gested that Nebraska's eligibility for federal education funds would 
be jeopardized if evangelicals could show that state education offi-
cials were practicing religious discrimination in their attempts to 
close the Faith Christian School.87 
In addition to federal scrutiny, Nebraska became the subject of 
national publicity, frequently negative, for its jailing of individuals 
who acted on the basis of religious conscience. Injanuary 1984, for 
example, Reverends jerry Falwell andjessejackson, on separate oc-
casions, visited the Faith Christian School. 
Possibly in response to this publicity and possibly just unwilling to 
keep on jailing Fundamentalist Christian educators, Nebraska Gov-
ernor Robert Kerrey established a four-member panel to examine 
and report on the public policy questions surrounding the Christian 
school issue. Onjanuary 26, 1984, the governor's panel issued its 
report, concluding, among other things, that "[s]ome accommoda-
tion to the First Amendment freedom of religion claims of the Fun-
damentalist Christian school supporters must be recognized."88 
The panel thus recommended that standardized tests could be of-
fered to students in place of teacher certification and curriculum re-
quirements. Parents choosing that procedure would give the State a 
81. Nebraska Baptist School Locked by Court Order, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1982, at A16. 
82. Judith Miller, Fundamentalists Fight Nebraska over School, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
1982, at Al. The judge later suspended the padlock order to prevent potential violence. 
83. Disputed School Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1982, at B17. 
84. Devins, supra note 5, at 113. 
85. In re Contempt of Ralph Liles, 344 N.W.2d 626 (Neb. 1984). 
86. Devins, supra note 5, at 113. 
87. /d. 
88. THE REPORT OF THE GovERNOR's CHRISTIAN ScHOOL IssuE PANEL 27 Uan. 26, 
1984) [hereinafter NEBRASKA GOVERNOR'S REPORT] (copy on file with Author). 
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written statement saying that their religious beliefs dictated their 
choice and that they consented to testing.s9 
The governor's panel claimed that its recommendations struck 
"an appropriate balance between the legitimate interest of the State 
in the education of Nebraska youth and religious freedom."90 Yet, 
when placed in the context of the Nebraska situation, the panel re-
port appears to be no more than a political sellout. The panel ig-
nored its state supreme court decision in State v. Faith Baptist 
Church, 91 as well as its own finding that the state "clearly has an obli-
gation to establish reasonable and effective educational standards 
and to exercise an appropriate degree of control over all educa-
tional efforts."92 The panel concluded that "Nebraska teacher certi-
fication procedures as presently defined violate the First 
Amendment free exercise of religious rights of Christian schools."93 
The state legislature acted on the panel's recommendations and 
enacted legislation in April 1984.94 The new law does not require 
schools to provide any information to state officials. Instead, par-
ents who elect to send their children to a school that does not apply 
for state approval must provide the state with information about the 
education their children are receiving. Specifically, parents who find 
existing state regulations in conflict with their religious beliefs can 
satisfy state compulsory-education laws by submitting an "informa-
tion statement" that declares that their children attend school for 
175 days a year and that they are instructed in core curriculum 
subjects.95 
It is noteworthy that the state legislature had earlier failed on sev-
eral occasions to enact similar measures. Why this change in atti-
tude? One possibility is that the Faith Baptist situation raised the 
legislators' religious conscience. This possibility, however, does not 
explain the earlier resistance to similar legislative proposals-in-
cluding proposals made when Pastor Sileven was in jail and the 
Faith Baptist Church was padlocked. A second possibility is that the 
legislators viewed the current state of affairs as a no-win situation. 
National attention, the jailing of ministers and parents, and possible 
child custody proceedings certainly would make such a response 
plausible. A final possibility, as suggested by several state legisla-
tors, is that the governor made an agreement with the Nebraska 
State Education Association to support its educational reform pro-
posal introduced in the previous session in exchange for a promise 
89. Id. at 22. 
90. Id. at 1. 
91. 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb.), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981). 
92. NEBRASKA GovERNOR's REPORT, supra note 88, at 21. 
93. Id. at 3. 
94. NEB. REV. STAT.§ 79-1701 (1990). 
95. Id. § 79-1701(2); id. § 79-201. 
1992] 831 
that the Association would not lobby against compromise legisla-
tion, as senators said it had in previous years. 
Whatever the legislators' motivation, one thing is clear: The state 
viewed its regulatory scheme as less significant than these various 
countervailing factors. 
C. Michigan 
Political accommodations between the state and religious inter-
ests are the rule, not the exception. But political settlements are not 
always reached. Today, Michigan stands alone in demanding 
teacher certification in home study programs.96 Despite vocal pro-
tests at the state capitol,97 reform proposals are killed before they 
make their way out of the education committee.98 Perhaps a power-
ful teachers' union explains this resistance;99 perhaps Michigan 
lawmakers have deep-seated convictions concerning professional 
certification. Whatever the explanation, Michigan exemplifies a 
political culture generally hostile to religious liberty interests. Fur-
thermore, Michigan courts have decisively rejected challenges to 
teacher certification and other regulations by Fundamentalist Chris-
tian schools and home study programs.1oo 
Michigan's steadfast commitment to its regulatory regime-rein-
forced by state court rulings-prompts images of state education of-
ficials wielding a big regulatory stick to keep recalcitrant parents and 
schools in line. Not surprisingly, Michigan is more litigious than 
other states, with state officials filing at least a dozen truancy or edu-
cational neglect petitions against home schoolers each year. 101 In 
many ways, however, Michigan's pro-regulation image is more bark 
than bite. Rather than several hundred home school parents finding 
themselves in jail and their parental rights threatened, an uneasy 
truce has emerged between religious interests and state officials. 
Michigan's story is a tale of political compromise through gener-
ally lax law enforcement. Michigan home schoolers, knowing that 
formal compliance with the teacher certification requirement would 
be fatal to most home study programs, 102 read the law to suit their 
purposes. According to Dr. Pat Montgomery, a leader in Michigan's 
home education movement, "[n]owhere in the law does it say you 
96. MicH. CoMP. LAws § 388.553 (1991). 
97. Chris Parks, Home School Rally Held, UPI, Oct. 23, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, UPI File. 
98. Telephone Interview with Maggie Thelen, Department Specialist, Office of Edu-
cation and School Law, Michigan Department of Education (Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter 
Thelen Interview]. 
99. See Parks, supra note 97. Strong organizational resistance also may help explain 
mandatory teacher certification. For example, the National Education Association and 
National Association of Elementary School Principals flatly oppose home study. See 
Kohn, supra note 17, at 25. 
100. See Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373 
(Mich. 1986) (Christian schools); People v. Dejonge, 449 N.W.2d 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989) (home study). 
101. See Michigan: Another Round of Wins and Losses, HoME ScH. CT. REP., May-June 
1991, at 8; Michigan: Litigation Proliferates, HoME ScH. CT. REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 15. 
102. See Dorman, supra note 6, at 756-58. 
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have to have face to face contact with a certified teacher." 103 Mont-
gomery therefore encourages Michigan home school families to "in-
terpret the requirement to involve a certified teacher as to their own 
needs. Some meet with a certified teacher every day, while others 
merely talk to one on a phone once a year."I04 
The state, for the most part, accepts this subterfuge. According 
to one state official, once the local school officials are comfortable 
that the children are being well taught and are receiving an educa-
tion comparable to their public school counterparts, most local 
school officials are satisfied and back off from rigid enforcement of 
the statute.105 Home education advocates likewise agree that it is 
this process of compromise at the local level that has been the most 
successful in convincing officials that home educators do a good job 
of fulfilling all state interests in educating their children.106 This 
process of compromise or accommodation with local level officials is 
difficult to document, however. Unlike the confrontational ap-
proach, which has ample record in court cases and other state publi-
cations, the accommodation approach relies on quiet confidence 
building and is by its nature less publicized. Additionally, one inter-
pretation of this process is that home educators are quietly convinc-
ing local school officials to disregard the state law. 
Informal compromise is so effective here because, unlike other 
states, Michigan provides for oversight of all children-whether they 
attend a public, private, or home school-by district-level offi-
cials.107 Thus, where confrontation with state level agencies has at 
best produced marginal success in protecting parental rights and 
religious liberties, compromise and accommodation at the local 
level seems to have been considerably more effective. 
It is this atmosphere of local accommodation that has made home 
education in Michigan a potentially realistic alternative for families 
with strong religious motivations. Most home educators accept the 
statutory status quo because, as the situation now stands, even 
though there is considerable political tension at the state govern-
ment level, the "wink" home educators receive from local officials 
who are much more sensitive to local needs leaves them feeling rela-
tively free to operate.108 Indeed, home schoolers generally report 
103. Telephone Interview with Dr. Pat Montgomery, Founder & Chief Administrator, 
Clontara School (Oct. 21, 1991) [hereinafter Montgomery Interview]. 
104. Thelen Interview, supra note 98. 
105. See id. 
106. See Telephone Interview with David Kallman, Michigan Home School Attorney 
(Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Kallman Interview]; Montgomery Interview, supra note 103; 
Thelen Interview, supra note 98. 
107. See MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 388.551, .553 (1991). 
108. See Kallman Interview, supra note 106. 
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that they are not anxious to seek changes in the law. 109 They fear 
that opening the issue up for too much discussion could have nega-
tive repercussions. 110 
Right they are. Whereas North Carolina legislators embrace fun-
damentalist causes111 and Nebraska legislators see deregulation as 
the lesser of two evils, 112 powerful teacher unions in Michigan are 
likely to preserve state-prescribed credentialism. Despite divergent 
approaches, however, in all three instances a political solution 
emerged. That two are open and the other clandestine, though sig-
nificant, does not undercut the ultimate triumph of politics. 
D. Conclusion 
The explicit and implicit compromises reached in North Carolina, 
Nebraska, and Michigan are not unusual. On the question of state 
regulation of Fundamentalist Christian schools, several states-in-
cluding Alabama, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Vir-
ginia-have joined Nebraska and North Carolina in exempting 
religious schools from licensing, teacher certification, and curricu-
lum requirements. 113 Other states-including Colorado and Iowa-
have reached administrative compromises. 114 Finally, some states-
including Kentucky, Maine and Ohio-have failed to respond to 
court decisions striking down state laws and procedures.11s 
Changes in state laws governing home schooling are far more dra-
matic. In the past decade, thirty-two states have moderated or re-
pealed home study regulations.116 Sometimes, as in North Carolina, 
these reforms are a response to court rulings; 117 sometimes, they 
are a result of grass-roots political pressure. Whatever the explana-
tion, religious interests typically prevail in the legislative arena. 
Ill. Cooperation, Not Capitulation 
State concessions to Fundamentalist Christian educators and par-
ents are inevitable. For the most part, concessions also make good 
sense. At the same time, the state should not abandon those stu-
dents who either attend religious schools or study at home with reli-
gious parents. Instead, the state must demand that religious 
educators advance a limited number of public values. 
109. Montgomery Interview, supra note 103. 
llO. Id. 
Ill. See supra notes 45-54, 66-70 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
l13. See Carper & Devins, supra note 4, at 215. 
l14. See id. 
115. See Devins, supra note 5, at 118. These states perceived that it was better to leave 
the Christian day school issue dormant rather than prompt further controversy through 
the promulgation of a new regulatory scheme. 
l16. See supra note 6. 
l17. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. Kansas and Arkansas, for exam-
ple, enacted ·home school reform in response to court decisions. See Note, Home Educa-
tion v. Compulsory Attendance Laws: Whose Kids are they Anyway'!, 24 WASHBURN LJ. 274, 
292-96 (1985) (discussing Kansas reforms); House Adopts Home Education Bill, UPI, Feb. 
28, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing Arkansas). 
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A. Why Political Compromise Is Inevitable 
The state bears a great cost when it engages in open confronta-
tion with Fundamentalist Christian educators. The chief problem is 
one of enforceable sanctions.118 Under its parens patriae power, 
the state can, on occasion, assume custody of a child when such ac-
tion is in the child's best interest. 119 For example, the state may 
exercise this power in the face of parental neglect. According to 
Professor Sanford Katz, neglect statutes "in many respects, incorpo-
rate a community's view of parenthood. Essentially, they are pro-
nouncements of unacceptable child-rearing practices."120 While the 
state most frequendy exercises its parens patriae power to prevent 
physical abuse and neglect of children, 121 the state also has author-
ity under this power to enforce truancy statutes. 122 Fundamentalist 
Christian educators have been willing to push the state to this 
extreme. 
For many reasons, however, states do not want to reach this de-
gree of confrontation. The closing of churches, the jailing of indi-
viduals for practicing their religion, and the displacement of 
children demand a compelling justification. With Fundamentalist 
Christian school and home study students outperforming their pub-
lic school counterparts, 12 3 and with increasing public awareness of 
problems with public school education, 124 the state cannot offer a 
compelling justification for its enforcement actions. Moreover, with 
public attention focused on public schools, it is politically counter-
productive for the state to expend scarce educational resources on 
118. See Kagan, supra note 20 (discussing analogous problem of fund termination 
sanction as being too severe to be effectively utilized); supra notes 74-93 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Nebraska's experience in trying to enforce sanctions against Chris-
tian educators). 
119. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (stating that if minimal due 
process standards are met, parents can commit their child to a state mental hospital if it 
is in his or her "best interests"). 
120. SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 57 (1971). 
121. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 530 P.2d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (terminating 
parental rights upon a finding of abuse); In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781 (D.C. 1990) 
(awarding custody to maternal grandmother upon finding sexual abuse by stepfather 
and a failure of the mother to stop the abuse). 
122. See, e.g., In re James D., 741 P.2d 161, 166-67 (Cal. 1987) (upholding truancy 
statute as constitutionally justified by the legitimate governmental interest in compul-
sory education), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228, 
1229-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding truancy statute to not be unconstitutionally 
vague). 
123. On the virtues of private schools, see joHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MoE, PoLITICs, 
MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 67 (1990); jAMES S. CoLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL 
ACHIEVEMENT: PUBUC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982); see also supra 
note 17. 
124. On problems in public education, see CHESTER E. FINN, JR., WE MusT TAKE 
CHARGE: OuR ScHOOLS AND OuR FUTURE (1991); NAT'L CoMM'N ON ExcELLENCE IN EDu-
CATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983); Diane 
Ravitch, U.S. Schools: The Bad News is Right, WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 1991, at C7. 
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the enforcement of controversial private school regulations.125 
Deregulation of religious education-or nonenforcement of regu-
lations-seems a sensible political solution. Confrontations be-
tween the state and Fundamentalist Christian educators are 
politically divisive, are the focus of national attention, and, if carried 
to their logical extreme, ultimately may force the state to jail parents 
and ministers and seek custody of children. Additionally, if the state 
feels compelled to reverse its previous policies, it may appear weak, 
and its interest in education will be subject to challenge. The best 
political course is to strike a balance favoring religious liberty and 
parental rights. Massive legislative reform of both home instruction 
and church-affiliated schools bears this out. 
B. Why Cooperation Is Sound Educational Policy 
Noncooperation has failed; therefore, cooperation must be better. 
Put another way: state educational officials are likely to exert more 
influence by favoring cooperative strategies over adversarial ones. 
The National Association of State Boards of Education, for example, 
has suggested that "[p]ublic educators cannot avoid the issue of 
home schooling. . . . When public educators work cooperatively 
with home schooling parents they can enhance understanding and 
strengthen community ties." 126 Specifically, cooperation may make 
parents more willing to submit to state evaluation, thereby enabling 
the state to help parents become better teachers.127 As former 
United States Department of Education official Patricia Lines ob-
served, states should "work to build bridges . . . . Given a more 
favorable legal and political environment, it becomes possible to de-
velop positive public/private educational efforts."I2s 
Cooperation is also necessary to protect children. Home school 
and Fundamentalist Christian day school students might experience 
frequent disruptions in their education if the state vigorously en-
forced its regulatory scheme. In Nebraska, for example, children 
attending the Faith Christian School had to contend with both being 
taught in another state and not being taught at all.129 Obviously, 
this type of sporadic education harms children. Considering that 
the primary aim of compulsory schooling is the education of youth, 
the state should focus its attention on those children whose lives are 
most affected by its actions. 
Cooperation is not simply a way to stave off the costs of enforce-
ment. It makes sense because religious educators are not the en-
emy; instead, they are dedicated parents trying to do right by their 
125. Telephone Interview with Virginia Roach, Project Director, National Associa-
tion of State Boards of Education (Nov. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Roach Interview]. 
126. NATIONAL Ass'N OF STATE Bos. OF EDUC., HOME SCHOOLING, july 1988, at 2 
(copy on file with Author). 
127. Virginia Roach, Home Schooling in Times of Educational Rifonn, Eouc. DIG., Feb. 
1989, at 58, 61. 
128. Patricia M. Lines, An Overview of Home Instruction, 1987 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 510, 
516. 
129. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. 
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children. Parents do not teach their children at home or send them 
to religious schools because they are unconcerned. To the contrary, 
religious schools and home study programs exemplify the type of 
parent-child-school relationship that should be encouraged by the 
state. It should come as no surprise that children in these schools 
outperform their public school counterparts on nationally recog-
nized achievement tests.Iao 
State cooperation, finally, makes sense because it respects the 
rights of dissenting families to avoid state-prescribed socialization 
without calling into question the right of school authorities to incul-
cate community-selected values in public schools.181 Correlatively, 
there is a legitimate parental interest in "living one's life through 
one's children, [which] might be called the parent's right to exercise 
his religion through the child, and to extend through the child ideas, 
language, and customs which the parent believes to be impor-
tant." 182 Cooperation then is not simply the lesser of two evils. Plu-
ralism, religious liberty, and educational achievement all support 
cooperative strategies. 
C. The Limits of Cooperation 
Cooperation does not mean abdication. Some states, however, 
have elected to avoid conflicts with dissenting religious parents and 
educators by scrapping all meaningful regulations. In these states, 
students need not demonstrate proficiency in core subject areas. In-
stead, they need only take a standardized achievement test. 183 But 
to mandate test-taking without mandating a minimum passing score 
is to substitute the state's critical interest in the education of its 
youth with a symbolic fig leaf. 
This abdication of responsibility is as dangerous as it is irrespon-
sible. The challenge for lawmakers and regulators, as recognized by 
the National Association of State Boards of Education, is "to meet 
their obligations to assure all children receive a quality education 
130. See CoLEMAN ET AL., supra note 123, at 124-31, 176 (finding that private school 
students outperform public school students on standardized achievement tests); see also 
supra note 17. 
131. See Michael A. Rebell, Values Inculcation and the Schools: The Need for a New Pierce 
Compromise, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 37-38, 52-53 (Neal Devins ed., 1989) 
(describing the dilemma and proposing a voucher scheme based on cooperation to solve 
it). 
132. John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause, 51 S. CAL. L. REv . 
. 769, 806 (1978). 
133. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 17:236.l(D) (West Supp. 1991); supra notes 46-50, 58-
59, and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina); see also Frances F. Marcus, As 
Busing Begins in Schools, Louisiana Clears Way for Teaching in Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
1981, at Al4 (describing the lax system in Louisiana and the possible harm to students). 
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while considering the relative rights of parents to educate their chil-
dren."134 This challenge cannot be ignored. At the most practical 
level, many students participating in home study programs and at-
tending Fundamentalist Christian schools will later be "absorbed" 
into public school systems.135 More significant, the state's interest 
in the well-being of its children as well as its own well-being de-
mands that these children not be discounted. 
Education is a public good of fundamental importance. "It is the 
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for 
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment."136 Education, under this formulation, is too im-
portant to allow private schools to be freed from public school 
concerns. 
But what are these concerns? Clearly, private schools can be re-
quired to offer competent instruction in reading, writing, and arith-
metic. Private schools also can be made to conform to the Brown 
mandate of racially nondiscriminatory admissions.137 These conclu-
sions, however, tell us very little. The conflict between the funda-
mentalists and the regulators is not about the need for competent 
instruction; instead, the conflict concerns the definition of 
l 
competency. 
This problem is intractable, and I offer no magical solution. It is 
my opinion, however, that private schools should never be held 
more accountable for attaining the goals of compulsory education 
than are public schools. In short, if students in Fundamentalist 
Christian academies or home study programs test as well as their 
public school counterparts, the state cannot demand that such 
schools significantly change their methods of instruction. At the 
same time, the state can demand that teachers have at least a high 
school education (or pass an equivalency test}, that students are reg-
ularly tested, and that religious educators be placed under increased 
scrutiny when their students are not making adequate progress. Iss 
From the standpoint of private and home schools, this formula-
tion seems satisfactory, at least at present. Unless there is a consid-
erable change in the educational outcomes of public school 
students, private schools and home study programs should be able 
to match these outcomes without altering their preferred methodol-
ogy.139 Furthermore, compliance with simple nondiscrimination 
134. NATIONAL Ass'N OF STATE Bos. OF Eouc., supra note 126, at I. 
135. Id. at 2; Roach Interview, supra note 125. 
136. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
137. This is what the Supreme Court held in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 
(1976), a case involving a nons ector commercial private school. Bob Jones University v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), suggests that Runyon applies to religious schools. 
138. The National Association of State Boards of Education has suggested-but not 
formally endorsed-these and other regulatory initiatives. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF STATE 
Bos. OF Eouc., supra note 126, at 9-10. 
139. There is good reason to think that the educational outcomes of private schools 
will be higher than those of public schools. John Chubb and Terry Moe, for example, 
argue that private schools-unlike public schools-operate within a "market setting 
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places few burdens on private schools-even those religious schools 
that believe in the separation of the races. Under current standards, 
the only absolute limitation on such a school is the requirement of 
racially nondiscriminatory admissions.140 
Were public school standards to change, however, private and 
home schools might be asked to bear a greater burden. This pros-
pect is troublesome, for it may interfere with parental prerogatives 
in education. Were public schools to truly change for the better, 
however, it is nonetheless appropriate that expectations of private 
and home schools also rise. In other words, a ceiling on appropriate 
state demands must always be relativistic. We cannot lose sight of 
the fact that what it takes to educate youth for citizenship must al-
ways be our ceiling and our floor. 
IV. Conclusion 
The devolution of state governance over religious education 
should inform both individual rights interests and state officials. 
With Smith and other Rehnquist Court rulings increasingly speaking 
of the need to defer to govemment, 141 special intetests are begin-
ning to tum away from the courts and towards elected govem-
ment.142 "What may be new," as Professor Paul Weber observed, 
"is the idea that this comes to be seen as a political necessity, a 
'price' of having one's interests protected, of being responsible citi-
zens in a democracy."143 
This renaissance of populist reform undoubtedly makes a lot of 
sense. But populist reform-at least with respect to religious liberty 
issues-has always made a lot of sense. Before Smith, the judiciary's 
free exercise record was at best mixed. 144 Thus, religious liberty 
[where] ... there are strong forces at work-arising from the technical, administrative, 
and consumer-satisfaction requirements of organizational success-that promote school 
autonomy." CHUBB & MoE, supra note 123, at 37. For a critique of Chubb and Moe, see 
James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE LJ. 259 (1991). 
140. See Bob jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 575; Runyon, 427 U.S. at 178-79. 
141. Smith, for example, is not the only decision to uphold "a neutral law of general 
applicability" irrespective of its impact on constitutionally protected freedoms. Employ-
ment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,879 (1990). In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Rehn-
quist Court likewise upheld "a law of general applicability" irrespective of its impact on 
the First Amendment freedom of the press. 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991). 
142. The National Abortion Rights Action League, for example, recently informed its 
membership that "[c]learly Congress is our Court of Last Resort. All hope of protecting 
our constitutional right to choose depends upon our elected representatives .... " 
NARAL SuPREME CoURT ALERT (June 27, 1991) (quoted in Louis FISHER & NEAL 
DEVINS, PoLmCAL DYNAMICS oF CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (1992)). 
143. Paul J. Weber, Religious Accountability: Maximalist Positions, (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with The George Washington Law Review)(1992). 
144. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the Free Exer-
cise Clause prohibited the state from forcing Amish children to attend school); Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a regulation denying unemployment bene-
fits to an individual who refused to work on Saturdays on religious grounds violated the 
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interests generally have fared at least as well before elected officials 
than appointedjudges. Ironically, Smith may be a boon to religious 
liberty. By prompting religious liberty interests to focus reform ef-
forts before the elected government, the reform efforts may prove 
more successful. The proven success of religious educators in ac-
complis4,ing their objectives through politics, not the courts, bears 
this out. 
State officials can also learn from their experiences with religious 
educators. The state cannot be satisfied with court victories, popu-
list religious reformers will place great pressure on government to 
reform burdensome legislation and regulation. Rather than engage 
in often counterproductive adversarial battles, the state should en-
gage in constructive constitutional dialogues with religious liberty 
interests. These dialogues should seek compromise solutions that 
preserve legitimate state interests without unduly burdening reli-
gious liberty. At the same time, states must be careful not to con-
cede necessary interests simply to avoid unpleasant conflicts, as 
some states unfortunately did in an effort to appease Fundamental-
ist Christian educators. 145 
Whether religious interests and state officials will increasingly 
forge cooperative arrangements remains to be seen. Both sides 
should; constructive cooperation makes better policy than adver-
sarial litigation. That is the lesson of the battle between the state 
and Fundamentalist Christian educators. 
Free Exercise Clause); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that the gov-
ernment may not compel affirmation of religious belief) with Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 
(1986) (holding that government may make internal use of an individual's social security 
number over a religion-based claim); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) 
(holding that an Orthodox jew may not wear a yarmulke while on military duty); United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that religious belief prohibiting participation 
in government did not require exemption from social security tax); Gillette v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that the Selective Service System did not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause by conscripting individuals religiously opposed to war); Braunfeld 
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding that the burden on Orthodox jews to comply 
with a law prohibiting conducting business on Sunday was indirect). For commentary 
on the judiciary's record, see Ira C. Lupu, When Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the 
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989) (describing courts' reluctance to 
find that government practices actually burden religious exercise); Paul Marcus, The Fo-
rum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DuKE LJ. 121 7 
(tracing the free exercise doctrine standard through the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder 
and pointing out the need for further refinement of the balancing test established by the 
Supreme Court). 
145. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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